Qualified Immunity Denied Based on Dispute About Material Facts

Baskin v. Martinez, 243 N.J. 112 (2020). This Civil Rights Act case involved what Justice Albin, writing for the four-Justice majority, labeled a claim that “a justifiable police chase ended in an unjustifiable police shooting– the use of excessive force in violation of the Federal Constitution. The question was whether Detective Martinez, who shot plaintiff Baskin,was entitled to qualified immunity.

The Law Division granted summary judgment for the detective on qualified immunity. The Appellate Division reversed by a 2-1 vote. Based on the dissent, the detective appealed to the Supreme Court as of right. The Court upheld the reversal of summary judgment by a 4-3 vote. Joining Justice Albin in the majority were Chief Justice Rabner and Justices LaVecchia and Timpone. Justice Solomon authored a dissent, in which Justices Patterson and Fernandez-Vina joined.

The majority opinion was based on the presence of disputed material facts that made summary judgment on qualified immunity inappropriate. As Justice Albin recounted, though, there was no dispute about the facts that began the incident.

Detective Marinez and other police were patrolling a part of Camden that was known for drug activity when they saw Baskin pull his vehicle out of a parking lot without signaling. The police maneuvered their own cars so as to block Baskin’s. One vehicle pulled in front of Baskin and the other, driven by Martinez, blocked Baskin from behind. Baskin put his vehicle into reverse, rammed Martinez’s vehicle, and then fled on foot with a handgun tucked into the waistband of his shorts. Martinez repeatedly yelled “police, stop,” but Baskin kept running, at one point dropping the gun and then picking it up again. At that time, Martinez unholstered his own gun.

Finally, Baskin ran into a walled-in backyard. Out of Martinez’s sight, Baskin tossed his gun away. Realizing he had nowhere to go, Baskin stopped running.

That is when the facts became disputed. Baskin testified that he raised his hands, empty, over his head and held that position until Martinez came into the walled-in area and saw Baskin. A witness confirmed that. But Martinez testified that he slowly rounded a corner until he could get a full view of what turned out to be the walled-in yard. At that point, he said, he saw Baskin standing with his back to Martinez. Baskin then turned around with his right arm extended and holding a black object that Martinez thought was a gun. Fearing for his life, Martinez fired his gun, striking Baskin in the abdomen.

After reciting those facts and offering a lengthy analysis of the relevant law, the majority held that the testimony most favorable to Baskin, the opponent of summary judgment, had to be accepted. On that evidence, Baskin had his empty hands over his head when Martinez shot him. Justice Albin cited a number of federal cases for the “simple and seemingly incontrovertible proposition” that “[o]ur constitutional jurisprudence makes clear what every police officer understands– it is not objectively reasonable to shoot a person suspected of committing a crime after he has placed his empty hands above his head in an act of surrender.” If a jury accepted those facts, Baskin’s clearly established rights would have been violated.

It was not for the Court, but for a jury, to decide the fact dispute, Justice Albin said. Accordingly, the majority affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division majority to reverse the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Justice Solomon’s dissent recognized the fact dispute about what position Baskin assumed at the end of the chase. But in the dissent’s view, qualified immunity was still appropriate even if Baskin’s “hands were empty and raised.” In “the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of an officer on the scene,” beginning with the undisputed facts of how and why the chase began and how it proceeded until Baskin entered the walled-in area, Martinez’s belief that he needed to use deadly force was reasonable.

The majority’s response to that was that “[t]he law is also clear that a suspect’s conduct leading up to his attempt to surrender cannot alone justify shooting the suspect– using deadly force against him– when his hands are above his head in an act of submission and he no longer poses a threat.” That view carried the day.