The NJSBA Annual Meeting in Atlantic City featured a program today on the “nuts and bolts” of appellate practice.  The panel of speakers was headed by Judges Carchman and Messano.  Naturally, many of the “nuts and bolts” were the kinds of things that, though useful, have been said elsewhere, such as here and here.  At least three pointers, however, were about things that do not often crop up at such sessions. read more

W.J.A. v. D.A., ___ N.J. ___ (2012).  The doctrine of “presumed damages” allows plaintiffs in defamation cases to obtain damages even without a showing of actual harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.  In slander cases (other than those involving slander per se, which entails accusations of crime, loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or misfeasance in business), a plaintiff must prove actual damages, and the doctrine of presumed damages is therefore inapplicable.  In slander per se cases, and in all libel cases, plaintiffs can benefit from the doctrine of presumed damages.  The question in this case, which involved allegedly defamatory statements made on the internet, was whether the doctrine of presumed damages remains viable.     read more

Seals v. County of Morris, ___ N.J. ___ (2012).  While driving on a snow-covered road, plaintiffs could not negotiate a curve in the road and struck a JCP&L electrical pole located near the side of that road.  The County of Morris did not own, but did have an easement over, the property on which the pole was located.  Plaintiffs sued JCP&L for negligently placing the pole and the County for negligently allowing the placement.  Defendants sought summary judgment, which the Law Division denied.  The Appellate Division reversed, holding that JCP&L could not be liable because the County had implicitly approved the siting of the pole by not objecting to it.  As to the County, the Appellate Division remanded for more factual development. read more

Sauro v. Sauro, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2012).  This contentious divorce action boiled down to the complaint of a large law firm that an equitable distribution award was improper because, in making that award, the Family Part improperly elevated the interests of the divorcing couple’s children in having money available for their college education above the law firm’s charging lien.  Though the two parents had agreed on virtually nothing else in that lengthy litigation, both parents, acting pro se in the Appellate Division, contended that the Family Part had acted rightly.  The panel, speaking through Judge Fuentes, agreed. read more

New Jersey Ass’n of School Adminstrators v. Schundler, ___ N.J. ___ (2012).  This case required the Supreme Court to parse and reconcile an unusually complex scheme of statutes and regulations that dealt with benefits available by contract to high-level school administrators.  In 2007, the Legislature passed measures designed to hold down property taxes and to address the level of benefits for high school administrators.  The Commissioner of Education then promulgated regulations to implement the new law, including provisions to limit benefits in new contracts for high-level administrators and to cap payment, prospectively only, for unused sick leave days at $15,000. read more

In Emma v. Evans, 424 N.J. Super. 36 (App. Div. 2012), the Appellate Division addressed the question of whether the presumption in favor of the parent of primary residence who seeks a surname change for a child, established in Gubernat v. December, 140 N.J. 120 (1985), where the parents were unmarried, applies to a child whose parents were married but got divorced.  The Appellate Division’s decision is discussed here.  The panel ruled that the Gubernat presumption does not apply where the child was born in wedlock to parents who later divorce.  The Supreme Court has now granted review of that decision. read more

Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. New Jersey Transit Corp., ___ N.J. ___ (2012).  This case involved an effort to disqualify counsel in a construction case for a conflict of interest under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 (“RPC 1.9″).  The Law Division denied disqualification.  In a published opinion, reported at 419 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 2011), and discussed here, the Appellate Division affirmed.  The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and unanimously reversed, in an opinion by Justice Hoens.  read more

Yesterday’s New York Times contained a column by Adam Liptak, who covers the Supreme Court of the United States, entitled “Are Oral Arguments Worth Arguing About?”  That column makes the point that, ultimately, whether an appellate oral advocate delivers his or her oral argument seamlessly matters far less than the merits of the case.  read more