L.C. v. M.A.J., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  In Cho v. Trinitas Regional Medical Center, 443 N.J.  Super. 461 (App. Div. 2016), discussed here, Judge Espinosa wrote an opinion that stated emphatically that a motion in limine right before trial that seeks dismissal or summary judgment is not only unauthorized under the Court Rules but constitutes a violation of due process.  Today, Judge Fisher issued a concise (eight pages total, including the caption, and with only two lines on the eighth page) opinion in a domestic violence case that reiterated the idea that motions in limine that are in fact concealed dispositive motions on the shortest of notice are improper. read more

The Palisades at Fort Lee Condominium Association, Inc. v. 100 Old Palisade, LLC, ___ N.J. ___ (2017).  This opinion, by Justice Albin for a unanimous Court, involved a lengthy construction defect litigation.  The issue was when the plaintiff condominium association’s claims “accrued” for purposes of the six-year property damage statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.  That statute states that a case must be commenced within six years “after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” read more

Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co. No. 2, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  The Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14 (“CEPA”) protects “employees who report illegal or unethical work-place activities.”  CEPA defines an “employee” as one who “performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages or other remuneration.” read more

Today, the Supreme Court announced that it has granted review in three cases.  All three cases involve grants of certification, and one of them also is an appeal as of right due to a dissent by Judge Ostrer in the Appellate Division. read more

Kicking off its new term, the Supreme Court announced its first grant of review last Friday.  The Court granted leave to appeal in State v. Dickerson, another case under the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26.  The question presented, as phrased by the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office, is “Is the State required to produce search warrant information (including the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant and supporting investigative reports) prior to a detention hearing held pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26?”  In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division vacated portions of orders of the Law Division that denied the State’s application to detain defendant prior to trial, a denial that had been based on failure to produce search warrant information. read more

New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission v. DiVincenzo, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  In 2011, the New Jersey Election Law Commission (“ELEC”), an independent four-member body that enforces the Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act, N.J.S.A. 19:44A-1 to -77 (‘the Act”), voted unanimously to investigate alleged violations of that statute by in the 2011 election for Essex County Executive by Joseph DiVincenzo and his campaign treasurer, Jorge Martinez.  By 2013, however, one ELEC member died and another, Walter (now Justice) Timpone, recused himself.  Both of those men were Democrats.  The two remaining ELEC members, both Republicans, voted to issue a complaint against DiVincenzo and Martinez (together, “respondents”). read more

The Supreme Court announced today that Judge Espinosa has been temporarily assigned to Part E of the Appellate Division from September 1 through September 30, 2017.  That Order amends the General Assignment Order for 2017-18, discussed here, from which Judge Espinosa’s name was absent. read more

McClain v. Board of Review, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017).  In general, employees who leave work voluntarily are disqualified from obtaining unemployment benefits.  In 2015, the unemployment statute, N.J.S.A. 43;21-5(a), was amended to exempt from disqualification “an individual who voluntarily leaves work  with one employer to accept from another employer employment which commences not more than seven days after the individual leaves … the first employer.” read more