Allstars Auto Group, Inc. v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, 234 N.J. 150 (2018). The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (“NJMVC”) imposed fines and suspensions on eight car dealers for alleged violations of various NJMVC regulations. The dealers, all acting pro se, responded to notices of violation by providing explanations for their conduct, though without actually denying the allegations. The dealers also requested hearings. Concluding that no hearings were required since there were no disputed facts, the NJMVC denied hearings and imposed the sanctions. The dealers then got counsel, who asserted that there was no factual support for the charges, disputed the allegation, and requested hearings. The NJMVC again declined to hold hearings. The dealers appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed. Today, however, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed in these consolidated cases, in an opinion by Justice Fernandez-Vina.
In general, the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq., lays out the ground rules for administrative proceedings. But that statute (with one exception not applicable here) does not create rights to a hearing. Instead, the statute(s) that govern the particular context of a given case are the source of any such right.
N.J.S.A. 39:10-20, a part of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Ownership Law, requires (using “shall”) the opportunity for a hearing before a dealer can be suspended or have a license revoked. In turn, a regulation, N.J.A.C. 13:21-15.14(d) provides that where “issues of material fact or potentially mitigating circumstances are present,” a hearing must be held.
After reciting the standards of review applicable to administrative agency actions, Justice Fernandez-Vina ruled that the NJMVC had arbitrarily and unreasonably considered that there were no material fact disputes or mitigating circumstances presented. “Each of the dealers requested a hearing, and each request provided facts that the dealers intended to argue would constitute defenses to the alleged violations or would at least mitigate their severity. The pro se filings by the dealers were perhaps inarticulate in emphasizing disputed facts or law, but they clearly requested a hearing to contest the Commission action or present evidence of mitigating circumstances. Counsel’s letter, although sent after the Commission’s submissions deadline, remove any doubt regarding the dealers’ intent to challenge the imposition of fines and suspensions.”
Accordingly, hearings for all of the dealers were required. The Court did not determine whether those hearings were to be conducted by the NJMVC or by the Office of Administrative Law. That decision was for the NJMVC. Justice Fernandez-Vina did go on to reject the dealers’ contention that the NJMVC lacked the authority to assess fines for violations of its regulations. N.J.S.A. 39:10-20, ironically the same section on which the dealers relied to claim a right to hearings, “explicitly authorizes the Commission to impose such fines and …. No promulgation of a fine schedule for each regulation is necessary.”