The Supreme Court has granted review in five cases.  One of them is an appeal as of right, by virtue of a dissent in the Appellate Division.  That case is State v. Twiggs.  The question presented there, as phrased by the Supreme Court Clerk’s Office, is “When addressing the statute of limitations in a criminal matter, is N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6’s tolling provision- which applies when ‘the actor’ is identified by means of DNA evidence- triggered where the DNA analyzed belongs to a third party, rather than the defendant?”  The Appellate Division’

Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Tp. Bd. of Adj., 448 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 2017).  The Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”), in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5, contains a “time of application rule” that determines what ordinance governs a land use development application.  Under that provision, regulations that are in effect “on the date of submission of an application for development” will apply.  But what qualifies a submission to a pla

Today is inauguration day for Donald Trump.  He and his designee to head the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Dr. Ben Carson, might take a lesson from a decision issued on this date in 1983 by a unanimous Supreme Court of New Jersey.  That opinion is Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983), otherwise known as Mount Laurel II (Mount Laurel I having been decided in 1976, as discussed here).

Among other things, the opinion in Mount Laurel II