Griepenburg v. Ocean Tp., 220 N.J. 239 (2015). In Riggs v. Long Beach Tp., 109 N.J. 601 (1988), the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether a municipal zoning ordinance is valid. In this case, plaintiffs challenged municipal ordinances that rezoned a large tract of land, including plaintiffs’ property, from residential and commercial use to an Environmental Conservation district. That had the effect of restricting plaintiffs’ development of their property. The Law Division applied Riggs and found the ordinances valid. That court also rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the ordinances as applied and rejected plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation, granting summary judgment in favor of the Township because plaintiff had not first exhausted administrative remedies by attempting to seek a variance. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the ordinances were invalid. The Supreme Court granted certification and ruled that the ordinances were valid, and that plaintiffs’ grievances were best addressed through the inverse condemnation process, which required plaintiffs to seek a variance first, as the Law Division had ruled. Justice LaVecchia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.
In accordance with “smart growth” principles of the State Development and Redevelopment Plan, the Township had decided to implement development in “compact centers surrounded by low-density environs.” That idea was designed to combat “sprawl” and to “protect environmentally sensitive areas outside of the center.” With the approval of the State Planning Commission, the Township submitted a plan to designate as environmentally protected “a rare contiguous coastal forest area that represents the last substantial undeveloped land in the Township,” so as to “preserve a large contiguous ecosystem.” The Township then adopted ordinances to effectuate that plan. It was these ordinances that plaintiffs challenged.
The trial consisted largely of a battle of experts. Plaintiffs’ experts said that the ordinances were invalid because plaintiffs’ affected properties did not have “any of the usual environmental constraints” that justify placement in an environmental conservation zone, such as “threatened or endangered species, floodplains, wetlands, [or] steep slopes.” The Township’s expert testified that the ordinances were valid because plaintiffs’ properties, which were largely wooded but contained plaintiffs’ own home as well, were “a key connection point” linking other wooded areas, as part of the Township’s “smart growth” plan of preserving larger, contiguous undeveloped areas. The Law Division found that the Township’s goal was a legitimate one and that the ordinances were valid. Among other things, the evidence showed that plaintiffs’ property was “part of a habitat, or a potential habitat,” for endangered species, and it was thus not arbitrary or unreasonable under Riggs to include that property “as part of a contiguous whole.”
Justice LaVecchia stated that in an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts must “give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions.” Here, the Law Division did that, as Justice LaVecchia went on to explain. Accordingly, the Court “defer[red] to the soundly based determination that all of the Riggs factors were satisfied and that the challenged Ordinances are valid.” The Township could properly zone to “create a contiguous tract, or corridor, of environmentally related, sensitive coastal uplands in order to preserve and protect coastal habitat and ecosystems and to provide a buffer for its corresponding intention to promote smart growth in a sustainable, concentrated town center.” The Court found it important that the Law Division had determined that “the Ordinances were not designed specifically to inhibit development on the plaintiffs’ property.”
Plaintiffs could still seek relief from the rezoning by applying for a variance, “the remedy that is best.” Justice LaVecchia emphasized that exhaustion of administrative remedies is “particularly well suited to determine whether an otherwise valid ordinance creates a hardship as applied to a particular property.” There was no reason to assume that a variance application would be futile in this case.
Plaintiffs and their amici curiae had relied on Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Warren Tp., 169 N.J. 282 (2001), where the Court had invalidated an ordinance as to the plaintiff’s property without first requiring that the plaintiff seek a variance. But Justice LaVecchia said that Pheasant Bridge did not “suggest that a landowner challenging an ordinance as applied to his or her property is excused from first exhausting administrative remedies.” She cited a number of other Supreme Court cases where property owners who challenged zoning ordinances were required to exhaust administrative remedies, and she observed that, in Pheasant Bridge, “exhaustion of remedies was not an overt issue in the appeal.”