Government of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 634 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2011). It’s not often that a case from the Virgin Islands affects the law of appellate practice in the Third Circuit generally. This case, however, deals with two important appellate issues: when a notice of appeal is sufficient, and what standard of review applies to a district court’s interpretation of that district’s local rules.
Mills involved a notice of appeal filed by a pro se criminal defendant. The Virgin Islands has its own rules of appellate procedure. Those rules include a provision that parallels Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), requiring that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment [or] order … appealed from.” The notice of appeal in Mills created some confusion because Mills had been convicted of assault in one case and of murder in another case. His notice of appeal referred to the case number and the trial date for the assault conviction, though he intended to appeal the murder conviction. The notice of appeal also stated that the appeal was being taken to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals when, in fact, the Third Circuit was the proper forum.
The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the mistaken case number and trial date (but not the erroneous mention of the Second Circuit) in the notice of appeal. The Virgin Islands Appellate Division granted dismissal. On further appeal to the Third Circuit, however, with Mills now represented by counsel, the dismissal was reversed in an opinion by Judge Smith.
The first issue that the Third Circuit faced was the scope of review. The dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Division was based on the Virgin Islands Appellate Rules, which have the status of local rules. The earliest Third Circuit cases that discussed appellate review of interpretations of local rules held that deference was to be given to a court’s view of its own local rules. Later cases, however, stated that the standard of review was “plenary.” Judge Smith held that the later cases had to give way to the earlier ones, under the principle that a conflict between cases is resolved in favor of the earlier decision. Thus, Mills reestablishes a deferential standard of review of a lower court’s interpretation of its own local rules.
That did not resolve the issue, however, since the local appellate rule mirrored Fed. R. App. 3(c), and the caselaw relied on by the Appellate Division arose under the federal rule. “As a practical matter, then, the Appellate Division’s decision rests on an interpretation of the Federal Rules, which requires us to conduct plenary review.”
On the merits, Judge Smith observed that notices of appeal are construed liberally, in light of the policy that dismissal of an appeal for failure to comply with procedural rules is not favored. That is especially true where, as in Mills, the appellant is pro se. Moreover, prejudice to the adversary is a factor in the analysis, and the government had not shown prejudice. Indeed, since the assault case had long been closed, while Mills had only just been convicted on the murder charge, it was evident that the notice of appeal was intended to relate to the murder. Moreover, the mistaken reference to the Second Circuit as the appellate forum, on which neither the Appellate Division nor the government relied, was not fatal, since the Third Circuit was the only appellate venue available.
“In light of all the circumstances,” the court concluded, the notice of appeal was sufficient, “if just barely.” Whew!