In the Matter of Registrant R.H., ___ N.J. ___ (2024); In the Matter of Registrant J.A., ___ N.J. ___ (2024). These decisions, both unanimous, were issued yesterday. Chief Justice Rabner authored the opinion in R.H. The concise three-page ruling in J.A. was per curiam and relied substantially on R.H.
The issue in both cases (actually, three cases, since R.H. itself involved two different defendants) arose under Megan’s Law. Chief Justice Rabner well summarized the question presented and the result at the start of his opinion:
“Megan’s Law requires individuals who commit certain sex offenses to register with a law enforcement agency. If they meet certain requirements, they can apply to terminate their obligation to register. One requirement is ‘that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) (emphasis added [by Chief Justice Rabner]). Another is that the person is ‘not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.’ Ibid.
“This consolidated appeal raises a novel question: whether the requirement to remain offense-free applies to juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent. Based on the plain language the Legislature used in crafting the statute, we find that the requirement applies to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults and convicted of a listed sex offense, or released from a correctional facility, but not to those who are adjudicated delinquent in proceedings in the family court.
“Consistent with the law’s text, however, all registrants including juveniles must satisfy the second requirement — the public safety requirement — to be eligible for termination of their obligations under Megan’s Law.
“Because the Appellate Division reached a different conclusion regarding the first requirement, we reverse its judgment and remand both cases involved in this appeal to the trial court for further proceedings.”
Applying de novo review in its review of the interpretation of Megan’s Law, the Court began by emphasizing that statutory plain language is the best indicator of legislative intent and other basic principles of statutory interpretation. The issue of interpretation arose because, as Chief Justice Rabner stated after offering some background as to how cases in which juveniles are accused of misconduct can proceed, “in our system, adults and some juveniles are ‘convicted,’ while other juveniles are ‘adjudicated delinquent.’ The two concepts are distinct in law and practice.”
The relevant statutory section, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), states: “Except as provided in subsection g. of this section, a person required to register under this act may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Chief Justice Rabner noted that a number of other provisions of Megan’s Law expressly apply to those “adjudicated delinquent,” but section (f) plainly does not. “Those examples demonstrate that the Legislature made policy choices in the way it crafted Megan’s Law. It decided when to extend the law to juveniles adjudicated delinquent and when not to.” The Court would not rewrite the statute to say something that the Legislature, in its plain language, did not say.
Because this case involved a “novel question,” there was no previous direct authority addressing the issue of this matter. As a result, the parties had relied in briefing on dicta in two cases, In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304 (2001), and State in Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44 (2018). Chief Justice Rabner discussed both cases and determined that their dicta did not undercut the Court’s result.
Because defendants were adjudicated delinquent rather than being convicted of any offense, the “offense-free” prong of section (f) did not apply to them. But they needed to satisfy the “no threat to the safety of others” prong. The Court reversed the Appellate Division, which (like the trail court) had ruled against defendants by applying the “offense-free” prong, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Defendants have the opportunity to show that they meet the “no threat” prong, but they must do so by clear and convincing evidence.
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