In the last three days, the Supreme Court issued opinions in two criminal cases and one civil appeal. All three decisions were unanimous. Here are summaries of those rulings:
State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308 (2023). This opinion yesterday by Justice Pierre-Louis addressed the question “whether the odor of marijuana in a vehicle authorizes a search of the engine compartment and trunk under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” The Law Division and the Appellate Division had each denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in that search. The Supreme Court recognized that “the standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential,” though legal conclusions of lower courts are reviewed de novo. By a 7-0 vote, the Court held that the search of the engine compartment and trunk was unauthorized. After canvassing at length prior cases regarding when the odor of marijuana justifies a search of an automobile, Justice Pierre-Louis concluded that “[a]lthough he smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car, the trooper’s initial search yielded no results and provided no justification ‘to extend the zone of the . . . search further than the persons of the occupants or the interior of the car'” (quoting State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1 (1980)). The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
State v. Erazo, 254 N.J. 277 (2023). This was another suppression of evidence case. Justice Solomon wrote this opinion for a 6-0 Court (Judge Sabatino did not participate). Defendant had sought o suppress evidence of a confession that he gave in a second interview with police. The first interview was conducted when defendant was not in custody, so the police were not obligated to and did not read defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Later that same day, however, after acquiring evidence that led the police to believe defendant was a suspect in the rape and murder being investigated, the police read defendant his rights and interrogated him again. He confessed during that interview. The Law Division denied defendant’s motion to suppress the confession, and defendant then pled guilty. On his appeal of the denial of the suppression motion, the Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court then reversed, agreeing with the Law Division that suppression was not called for in these circumstances.
Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune, 254 N.J. 242 (2023). In Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), the Supreme Court held that in Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) cases, a successful requestor of public records can be awarded attorneys’ fees under the “catalyst doctrine.” [Disclosure: I represented an amicus curiae in support of the successful plaintiff in that case.] That doctrine states that fees are awardable when a requestor has not directly prevailed in OPRA litigation but can show (1) a factual causal nexus between the litigation and relief ultimately achieved; and (2) that the relief achieved had a basis in law. OPRA claims are often accompanied by claims under the common law right of access. Plaintiff here prevailed on a common law right of access claim and sought attorneys’ fees under the catalyst doctrine. The Law Division made a partial fee award, but the Appellate Division, while finding that the catalyst doctrine could extend to common law right of access claims in some circumstances, ruled that this case was not one of those circumstances and reversed the fee award. In a 6-0 opinion written by Justice Patterson (Justice Fasciale did not participate), the Supreme Court held that the catalyst doctrine did not apply in common law right of access cases. Justice Patterson discussed the limited exceptions to the “American Rule” that each party generally bears its own attorneys’ fees and determined that common law right of access cases did not fall within any of those exceptions.