In re Civil Commitment of J.S., SVP 24-99, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2021). Judge Mawla issued this opinion for the Appellate Division today. It involved an appeal from the decision of the Law Division that defendant
continued to be a sexually-violent predator who was therefore to be civilly committed in the Special Treatment Unit under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”), N.J.S.A.30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
Most of Judge Mawla’s opinion is devoted to an exhaustive recitation of the key facts. The legal issue in the case, however, was defendant’s claim that his attorney had failed to provide effective assistance at the commitment hearing.
Judge Mawla observed that the standard of review of a decision in a commitment proceeding is “extremely narrow,” and that “judges who hear SVPA cases generally are ‘specialists’ and ‘their expertise in the subject’ is entitled to ‘special deference'” (quoting In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2014)). Only if the record reflects a “clear mistake” should such a decision be reversed.
Defendant argued that the test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987), should be applied to SVPA commitment proceedings. He acknowledged that that test had not been applied in that context before. Recognizing that “[t]here is no precedent applying Strickland/Fritz to commitment proceedings of the sort in this case,” Judge Mawla agreed that the test should apply.
Judge Mawla began by noting that “[c]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Persons who are the subject of commitment hearings have a right to counsel under statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.14(a), and caselaw.
Judge Mawla also noted the constitutional right to counsel under both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. That right “encompasses the right to adequate legal advice,” as Strickland and Fritz observed. Judge Mawla concluded that “[b]ecause commitment proceedings affect the fundamental liberty right of the individuals subject to them, and given the law expressly recognizes the right to counsel in these cases, Strickland/Fritz clearly applies.
Defendant won that battle, but he lost the war. Judge Mawla observed that “because prejudice is not presumed, Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, the party asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must demonstrate ‘how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability’ of the proceeding” (quoting
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984)). As Judge Mawla proceeded to explain, defendant did not successfully carry that burden. Thus, the panel affirmed the decision below.