Montclair State University v. County of Passaic, 234 N.J. 434 (2018). This case centered on the proper application of Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142 (1972). As discussed here, in connection with the Appellate Division’s opinion in this case, which was reported at 451 N.J. Super. 523 (App. Div. 2017), the Rutgers decision essentially immunized state universities from local land use regulation, though universities still must consult with local authorities, consider their concerns, and act reasonably in addressing them.
The Appellate Division in this case reversed a trial level decision that had dismissed Montclair State’s case, which sought a declaratory judgment that no local or county approvals were necessary for MSU to create a third egress from its campus onto a county road. The panel remanded the case to the Law Division for further proceedings. Today, in a 6-0 decision by Justice LaVecchia, the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, while modifying it in one respect in order to guide the proceedings on remand.
Justice LaVecchia essentially reaffirmed the principles of Rutgers. After summarizing that case in detail, and discussing two other Supreme Court cases that preceded it, she confirmed that MSU, as a state university, “enjoys the qualified immunity from local land use controls with respect to management of its own land and property that was recognized in Rutgers.”
Justice LaVecchia then clarified the Rutgers test to be applied on remand, expressing concern that the Appellate Division’s opinion “can be interpreted to to have inadvertently conflated the two parts of the Rutgers analysis into one.” She reiterated that the trial court “first must assess the reasonableness of the MSU roadway plan in its entirety,” including “review of its off-site impact.” Separately, in the second part of the Rutgers test, “[t]he trial court must whether MSU reasonably consulted and took into consideration the legitimate concerns of the local governmental entities…. The consultation function is meaningful to the analysis, not merely procedural.”
Finally, because this case raised safety concerns created by the fact that drivers leaving MSU’s campus and merging onto the county road would be descending an incline, where speed and the curvature of the road might be issues, the Court added a prong to the Rutgers analysis to address the safety issues. (Rutgers itself did not involve questions of safety). “In the circumstances presented here, where a facially legitimate public safety concern is raised about an immune entity’s planned improvement to lands, which would have a direct impact on non-state-owned property, we will require a showing by the immune entity that its planning has reasonably addressed the planning concerns,” and “a discrete judicial finding that MSU’s proposed action reasonably satisfies public safety concerns.”
Local governments are free to argue the contrary, and Justice LaVecchia left to the trial court’s discretion whether the remand could proceed in summary fashion under Rule 4:67 or whether “the taking of live testimony or the receipt of other evidence is necessary.” But she closed by making “clear [that] an immune entity is not to be subjected to a requirement of submission to planning board review or the like.” Thus, the Court reaffirmed the core holding of Rutgers, while adding a requirement that applies to cases involving questions of public safety.
This deals with Planning Boards. Would this apply to Highway Access on a state highway? Access is reviewed and approved by a NJDOT unit that is not part of a Planning Board.