Some Philadelphia Rail Stations are Unlawfully Handicapped-Inaccessible, Third Circuit Says

Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. SEPTA, 635 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2011).   The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), a federal statute, by definition applies nationwide.  As a result, the Third Circuit’s decision in this case, which involves a complaint that portions of the public transit system in Philadelphia were not made handicapped-accessible, should be of interest to New Jerseyans, even those who do not use the mass transit operated by SEPTA, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.

The ADA does not mandate that existing transportation facilities be made accessible.  However, when “alterations” are made to an existing facility covered by the statute, the altered portions must be made “readily accessible” to individuals with disabilities “to the maximum extent feasible.”  The meaning of the three terms quoted in this paragraph were at the heart of this case. 

Construction work was done in two different SEPTA stations.  In one location, the only stairway at the station was demolished and replaced.  In the other station, an escalator was repaired.  Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania (“DIA”), a nonprofit group that advocates for the rights of persons with disabilities, filed suit, asserting that these were “alterations” that triggered an obligation to make both stations accessible and demanding that elevators be placed in each of the stations.  The district court granted summary judgment to DIA.  SEPTA appealed.

The Third Circuit affirmed in a decision written by Judge Fuentes that rejected SEPTA’s view of the statutory language and associated regulations.  For example, SEPTA argued that the fact that installing elevators would significantly increase the cost of the work made the elevators not “feasible” since, according to SEPTA, economic feasibility is part of the calculus.  The Third Circuit disagreed, noting that, in any event, SEPTA had shown only that installing elevators might be “disproportionate” to the cost of the rest of the construction, not that it would be “truly economically infeasible” (emphases by the Court).

There were many wrinkles that the Court had to address, so the full opinion is definitelly worth reading.  Judge Jordan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  His dissent related to the fact that one of the areas subject to the construction was owned by the City of Philadelphia, which was not a party.  The majority found that argument unpersuasive, especially since SEPTA had not raised it below.