Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S.Ct. 1017 (2013). Mr. Chafin, a United States citizen serving in the military, and Ms. Chafin, a citizen of the United Kingdom, had a daughter, E.C. When Mr. Chafin was deployed to Afghanistan, Ms. Chafin took E.C. to Scotland. Thereafter, Mr. Chafin was transferred to Alabama, and Ms. Chafin brought E.C. there. Mr. Chafin filed for divorce. Ms. Chafin was deported, leaving E.C. with Mr. Chafin.
Ms. Chafin then filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, seeking to have E.C. returned to Scotland. The district court granted her petition, and she immediately took E.C. to Scotland. Mr. Chafin appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the case was moot because E.C. was already in Scotland and a United States court could therefore do nothing further. Mr. Chafin was also ordered to pay Ms. Chafin $94,000 in attorneys’ fees, court costs, and travel expenses. Mr. Chafin petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted review and reversed in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts.
Article III of the United States Constitution requires a live “case or controversy” in order for federal courts to have power to act. When issues are no longer “live,” or when the parties “lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” a case becomes moot. But mootness arises “only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” That was not so here.
Mr. Chafin was continuing to seek custody of E.C. in the United States, and also wanted to undo the order requiring him to pay Ms. Chafin the $94,000 in fees, costs, and travel expenses. Though Ms. Chafin contended that United States courts have no jurisdiction to order a “re-return” of E.C. to this country, that argument, “which goes to the meaning of the Convention and the legal availability of a certain kind of relief[,] confuses mootness with the merits.” Mr. Chafin’s prospects of success were not pertinent to the mootness inquiry.
Ms. Chafin might choose to defy an order of a United States court. But she also might choose to obey such an order, which would certainly obviate any mootness argument. In any event, “[c]ourts often adjudicate disputes where the practical impact of any decision is not assured,” such as issuing default judgments against defendants who refuse to appear.
Mr. Chafin might have only a “small” remaining interest in the case, but that interest is still a “concrete” one. As a result, the case was not moot.