Little v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 2012). In this consumer class action, which involved alleged defects in Kia automobiles, Judge #1 presided over a classwide jury trial. The jury found for plaintiff and the class on the issue of repair costs but in favor of the defense on other claims, such as diminution in the value of the vehicles classwide. Defendant then moved for a new trial on the repair cost issue and also moved to decertify the class. Judge #1 decertified the class and granted a new trial on “individual damages suffered by each class member” only. The new trial was to be “handled on a claim-form basis.”
The case was then reassigned to Judge #2. Class counsel told that judge that they could no longer represent individual claimants because that would conflict with their representation of the class. Judge #2 granted a motion to recertify the class and referred the claims to a special master for a determination of which claim forms presented valid claims.
The special master opined that the jury verdict rejecting plaintiff’s claim for diminution in value could not stand. He recommended that Judge #2 allow consumers to seek not only individual repair damages but damages for diminution in value. Judge #2 agreed, over defendant’s objection that the special master’s view improperly reopened the jury verdict.
Defendant obtained leave to appeal, and the Appellate Division reversed. Judge Waugh noted that since the matters at issue were all legal questions, de novo review was appropriate. Moreover, though the Appellate Division was reviewing the decision of Judge #2 rather than that of the special master, no deference was owed to the legal conclusion of the special master.
Judge #1’s legal rulings had been the law of the case until the special master’s recommendation was adopted by Judge #2. “A hallmark of the law of the case doctrine is its discretionary nature, calling upon the deciding judge to balance the value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate judge against those factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.”
Judge Waugh found that Judge #2 had not identified factors that bore on the pursuit of justice or the search for truth. Moreover, Judge #2 had in effect vacated the jury verdict without articulating a reasoned basis for doing so. Since Judge #2 had not been the trial judge, there was no reason to afford deference to Judge #2’s “feel of the case, with regard to the assessment of intangibles, such as witness credibility.” The panel reversed the ruling of Judge #2 and remanded the case for further proceedings.