Estate of Murray v. Spiegle, 429 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2013). Judge Fisher, who sat in the Chancery Division before being elevated to the Appellate Division, wrote this opinion for a unanimous panel. The opinion is, in essence, a search for a rationale to support a plainly equitable result.
Jack M. Murray, the decedent, had made a will leaving his estate to his family members or to trusts for their benefit. Then, less than two months later, he opened a bank account that directed, upon his death, that the balance be paid to “William E. Spiegle, Atty.” Spiegle was the attorney in whose office Murray had signed his will. Murray had wanted to name a trust as the beneficiary, but he “was dissuaded by a bank representative because the trust documents were not at hand.” As a result, he named Spiegle. When Murray died, the bank account held over $143,000, about one-third of the entire estate.
Spiegle did not know why Murray would have done what he did. But Spiegle insisted on keeping the money. Murray’s personal representative sued him, alleging that Murray was not competent when he opened the bank account, or that Murray had made a mistake, or that his action was the product of undue influence by Spiegle. The personal representative won at a bench trial, with the Chancery Division ruling that the estate was entitled to the funds on a rescission theory because it ‘just doesn’t make any sense” that Murray would have intended to deprive his estate of the money and instead benefit Spiegle. Murray had no relationship with him other than an attorney-client relationship, and even Spiegle was surprised at what Murray had done.
Spiegle appealed. Judge Fisher noted that the Chancery Division’s findings were “based on substantial credible evidence and entitled to [the Appellate Division’s] deference.” Like the Chancery judge, Judge Fisher then canvassed various equitable theories on which to premise the relief to the estate. The opinion is a grand tour through equitable theories and remedies, touching on reformation, mistake, constructive trust, and rescission, among other concepts. The panel concluded that rescission was an appropriate basis for remedying Murray’s apparent unilateral mistake in opening the bank account as he did. Judge Fisher also noted, though, that the device of resulting trust or the doctrine of probable intent could also have supported the ruling below.
This opinion is an extremely useful catalog of equitable theories and remedies. The essence of the decision, though, is the recognition that Chancery remedies are adaptable to avoid injustice, and that “equity jurisprudence evolved as a means of avoiding injustices when meritorious claims failed to fit the rigid causes of action known at law.” Judge Fisher and the panel saw the realities and the equity of the situation, as did the Chancery judge, and reached the correct result. As Judge Fisher concluded, quoting Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals, “equity will find a way, though many a formula of inaction may seem to bar the path.” Cardozo would be proud of the Appellate Division’s ruling here.