NuWave Investment Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., 221 N.J. 495 (2015). This short per curiam opinion, issued today, affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Division, which was reported at 432 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2013). As discussed here, the Supreme Court granted review in order to decide the applicability of its decision in W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229 (2012), which addressed presumed damages in defamation cases. The Court applied that decision here, featuring it extensively in a discussion of the three types of damages that are potentially available in defamation cases.
As the Court observed, reiterating W.J.A., in defamation cases that do not involve public figures or matters of public concern, the concept of presumed damages “is a procedural device that allows a defamation case to go to the jury in the absence of proof of actual damages. If the jury finds the statement defamatory, without proof of actual damages, only nominal damages can be awarded. Presumed damages may not be awarded in any higher amount.”
The Court went on “to once again clarify the categories of damages in a defamation action. There are three: (1) actual; (2) punitive; and (3) nominal.” Actual damages, which are subdivided into “special” and “general” damages, are intended to be compensatory. “Special” damages “compensate a plaintiff for specific economic or pecuniary loss,” while “general” damages “address harm that is not capable of precise monetary calculation,” such as “impairment to reputation and standing in the community.” “Nominal” damages, which include “presumed” damages, serve merely to “vindicat[e] the character of a plaintiff who has not proved a compensable loss.”
The case also presented a statute of limitations issue. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3 contains a one-year statute of limitations for defamation. Here, “[p]laintiffs argue[d] that equity requires the statute of limitations for defamation actions to implicitly include a ‘discovery rule’ in cases involving confidential publications.” The Court considered itself “bound by the plain language of the statute” and therefore declined plaintiffs’ invitation to “create a judicial discovery rule” (even though the Court noted that “there is a strong argument that such flexibility might advance the cause of justice” in certain situations). The Court left to the Legislature the issue of whether to create a discovery rule for defamation contained in confidential documents.