A 3-3 Supreme Court Split Affirms the Appellate Division in Hyman v. Rosenblum Yeshiva of New Jersey

Hyman v. Rosenblum Yeshiva of New Jersey, ___ N.J. ___ (2024). As discussed here, in an opinion reported at 474 N.J. Super. 561 (App. Div. 2023), the Appellate Division affirmed a summary judgment for the defense in this defamation case brought by plaintiff, a rabbi who had been employed by defendant as an educator but whom defendant had terminated for what defendant stated was conduct that was unacceptable under Jewish law. That ruling relied on the “ministerial exception,” which was developed to prevent judicial interference with decisions of religious institutions as to employment matters where religious law might play a part. But this was a defamation case, not an employment discrimination case. The Supreme Court granted review to address this question: “Does the ministerial exception bar any tort claims raised by a former ministerial employee against a religious institution if those claims are related to the religious institution’s employment decision?”

Today, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in the case. The Court split 3-3, with Justice Wainer Apter not participating. Justice Patterson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Solomon and Fasciale. Justice Pierre-Louis wrote a dissent, in which Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Noriega joined. Both opinions are well worth reading in full. As discussed here, a 3-3 ruling affirms the decision below but carries no precedential weight going forward, so the issue presented here may reappear.

The two opinions agreed on the applicable legal test, which was embodied in McKelvey v.
Pierce
, 173 N.J. 26 (2002), as altered by two subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States. The concurrence concluded that the defamation claim at issue here would inevitably involve courts in making decisions about religious law, which the ministerial exception is designed to prevent. The dissent contended that whether courts would need to wade into religious law was not clear on the record before the Court, that discovery on that issue was required, and that the concurrence’s view effectively allows religious institutions immunity to commit torts against employees. The concurring Justices countered that they were not saying that every defamation claim by someone covered by the ministerial exception is barred by that exception. Rather, they said, their conclusion “is premised on the precise content of the statement that Hyman alleges to be defamatory, the elements of the defamation claims at issue here, and the specific inquiry that a court would undertake in order to resolve those claims.” Thus, the next case on this issue, if there is one, may or may not come out differently.