Three Published Appellate Division Decisions

The last several days have seen some interesting published opinions by the Appellate Division. Here are summaries of three of them:

Petro v. Platkin, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2022). This opinion by Judge Natali, which applied de novo review, affirmed a Law Division ruling that dismissed plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin and invalidate the Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act, N.J.S.A. 26:16-1 to -20 (“the Act”). The Appellate Division agreed with the Law Division that, despite New Jersey’s relatively liberal standing rules, none of the plaintiffs had standing to attack the Act because none of them (a terminally ill New Jersey resident, a physician, and a pharmacist) was affected by the Act. Participation under Act by physicians and pharmacists is purely voluntary, and the physician and pharmacist plaintiffs could and did choose not to participate. Similarly, “[n]othing in the Act compels [the terminally ill plaintiff] to request or ingest the medication” that the Act enables for use to end life. Judge Natali rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the Law Division’s analysis meant that no one had standing to challenge the Act, citing a California case that had addressed that same assertion. Finally, although it was not necessary to go further than the standing issue, the Appellate Division rebuffed plaintiffs’ various constitutional claims on the merits. Those arguments included the contention that the Act violated the “single object rule,” which says that “every law shall embrace but one object,” the New Jersey Constitution’s right to “enjoy and defend life,” and the United States Constitution’s free exercise of religion clause.

Barron v. Gersten, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2022). This was a concise opinion by Judge Gummer regarding the effect of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Omnibus Order, issued on June 11, 2020. That order provided that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, “in the computation of time periods under the Rules of Court and under any statute of limitations for matters in all trial divisions of the Superior Court, the period from March 16, 2020 through May 10, 2020 shall not be included in calculating those trial court filing deadlines.” Plaintiff contended that that language added 55 days (the number of days between March 16 and May 10, 2020) to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims found in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). The Law Division disagreed, holding instead that the Fourth Omnibus Order had merely treated those 55 days as a court holiday, and that as a result, plaintiff’s suit was untimely. After applying de novo review and carefully discussing the applicable Court Rule, Rule 1:3-1, Judge Gummer agreed. “Rule 1:3-1 makes clear when the statute of limitations expires on a legal holiday, the party must act on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. The Rule does not add to the statute of limitations all Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays that fall within the statute-of-limitations period.”

C.V. v. Waterford Tp. Bd. of Educ., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2022). Judge Rothstadt’s opinion in this case framed the “issue of first impression” presented to the Appellate Division as follows: “whether the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, applies to claims arising from a sexual predator’s criminal assaults against a young schoolgirl where those crimes were committed on a school bus. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the LAD does not apply, especially where, as here, there was no evidence that the predator’s compulsive and repetitive behavior was the result of any proven intention to discriminate specifically against young women.” Judge Rothstadt provided a lengthy analysis of the LAD, prior authority, and the fact record of this case, and concluded that there was “no evidence that [the predator] acted because of [the victim’s] gender. On the contrary, his own deposition testimony and history of sexual abuse towards at least one boy and other girls, indicated that his conduct was fueled by his pedophilia, and not gender discrimination. The LAD was simply not intended to provide a civil remedy for child sex abuse committed by compulsive pedophiles.” The Appellate Division made clear that it was not “imply[ing ]that sexual assault on a school bus can never be an act that is subject to an LAD claim.” Judge Rothstadt also observed that the New Jersey Child Sexual Abuse Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 et seq., which “does not require discrimination,” makes damages available to “a minor-plaintiff who demonstrates an ‘injury or illness’ that has a ‘causal relationship to the acts of sexual abuse,’ committed by an adult,” so that victims are not without statutory remedies for the conduct alleged in this case, in addition to actions for negligence.