Any Order That Compels or Denies Arbitration is Now Final and Immediately Appealable, Even if it Does Not Address All Issues and All Parties

GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011).  In Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008), the Supreme Court used its rulemaking power to amend Rule 2:2-3(a) to add orders compelling arbitration to the list of interlocutory orders that are deemed final for purposes of appeal.  Wein involved an order that compelled arbitration as to all issues and all parties in the case.  In contrast, the arbitration order in GMAC applied to fewer than all parties and issues.  The question for the Court was whether the principle of Wein should extend to those circumstances.  In a unanimous opinion by Judge Stern, the Court held that all orders granting or denying arbitration would now be considered final and immediately appealable.

New Jersey has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to  -32.  “Given the Uniform Act’s purpose to promote expeditious arbitration, and its express provision permitting appeals when arbitration is denied or stayed, we conclude that all orders denying and granting arbitration should be treated as final for purposes of appeal”  From a policy perspective, “[t]he policy behind Wein applies irrespective of whether other claims or parties remain in the trial court.”  The Court directed that appeals involving orders granting or denying arbitration be given a scheduling preference in the Appellate Division, just as interlocutory appeals receive. 

Judge Stern gave attorneys a crystal clear practice pointer.  “Because the order shall be deemed final, a timely appeal on the issue must be taken then or not at all.  A party cannot await the results of the arbitration and gamble on the results.”  His opinion concluded “with the following warning: as of today, litigants and lawyers in New Jersey are on notice that all orders compelling and denying arbitration shall be deemed final for purposes of appeal, regardless of whether such orders dispose of all issues and all parties, and the time to appeal therefrom starts from the date of the entry of that order.” 

This is a sound and practical result.  The Court has created a bright-line rule that is easy to for courts to administer and attorneys to follow.  Given the importance that our courts have ascribed to arbitration, there was no basis to distinguish between cases in which the arbitration order encompasses all issues and parties and those that do not.  Moreover, it would not have made sense to treat orders granting arbitration differently than those denying it.  Either type of order is worthy of prompt review, as the Court has now ruled.